Tax Policy in a Life Cycle Model by Lawrence H. Summers
Capital Taxation and Accumulation
in a Life Cycle Growth Model
By LAWRENCE H. SLJMMERS*
Almost all of the serious economic work
on savings decisions within the past decade
has relied on some variant of the life cycle
hypothesis in which savings arise out of indi-
vidual choices of an optimum lifetime con-
sumption path. This paper reexamines the
incidence and welfare consequences of capital
income taxes within a realistic life cycle
model. The results suggest that the elimina-
tion of capital income taxation would have
very substantial economic effects. For exam-
ple, a complete shift to consumption taxation
might raise steady-state output by as much
as 18 percent, and consumption by 16 per-
cent. The long-run welfare gain from such a
shift would for plausible parameter values
exceed $150 billion annually. Stated some-
what differently, shifting to consumption
taxation would raise the lifetime utility of the
representative consumer by the equivalent of
about six years' income in the new steady
state. These estimates dwarf estimates of the
static welfare cost of taxation, and signifi-
cantly exceed even extreme previous esti-
mates of the dynamic loss.
This study departs from earlier analyses of
the effects of taxes on capital income in
several respects. Probably the most im-
portant difference between this treatment and
most preceding ones lies in the assumptions
about the interest elasticity of saving. It is
shown below that the common two-period
formulation of saving decisions yields quite
misleading results. A more realistic model of
life cycle savings demonstrates that, for a
wide variety of plausible parameter values,
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savings are very interest elastic. This implies
that shifting away from capital income taxa-
tion would significantly increase capital for-
mation, making possible long-run increases
in consumption.
Many studies of the welfare effects of
capital income taxation have ignored the
general equilibrium effects of increased
capital formation. In an economy with life
cycle savings, there is no presumption that
the undistorted growth path corresponds to
any sort of social optimum. As Peter
Diamond has shown, life cycle savings can
lead to a steady-state capital intensity either
greater or less than the Golden Rule level.
More generally, it is clear that there is no
reason to believe that a life cycle economy
will maximize any particular intertemporal
social welfare function. A fundamental tenet
of welfare evaluation is that preexisting dis-
tortions must be considered in evaluating the
consequences of tax changes. The results pre-
sented in this paper take explicit account of
the nonoptimal character of the no-tax steady
state. This explains in large part why such a
sizeable welfare effect of capital taxes is
found. In an economy far from the Golden
Rule level of capital intensity, there are sub-
stantial gains in steady-state consumption
achievable through increased capital forma-
tion.
Section I of the paper examines the ag-
gregate savings function in a continuous-time
life cycle framework. The second section
clarifies the differences between wage and
consumption taxes. An aggregate production
function is added to complete the model in
the third section. The effects of changes in
capital taxes on both steady-state incidence
and welfare are considered within a general
equilibrium framework. The final section of
the paper discusses some implications of the
results and suggests areas which appear to
warrant further study.534 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 198
I. The Aggregate Savings Function
In all studies of the effects of capital in-
come taxation, the interest elasticity of the
aggregate savings rate emerges as a key
parameter. This parameter is also central to
questions ranging from the potency of mone-
tary policy to the appropriate discount rate
on public investments projects.' Both empiri-
cal and theoretical considerations have led
most economists to conclude that the interest
sensitivity of aggregate savings is likely to be
quite small. This section examines the im-
plications of the well-known life cycle hy-
pothesis for the interest elasticity of aggre-
gate savings. It is shown that the theory
when formulated realistically implies interest
elasticities well in excess of unity.
Most commonly, the impact of capital in-
come taxes has been considered within a
two-period framework, in which all income is
received within the first period.2 That is, the
representative individual is assumed to maxi-
mize an mtertemporal utility function of the
form U(C1, C2) subject to a lifetime budget
constraint:
(1) C, +=W,
where W1 represents labor income in the first
period. It can be shown3 that the interest
elasticity of savings depends on the elasticity
of substitution between present and future
consumption. If the elasticity is greater than
one, savings respond positively to the inter-
est rate, while an elasticity less than one
'Michael Boskin discusses the implications of the
interest elasticity of savings for several aspects of capital
accumulation. He finds that even an elasticity of .4 can
have an important impact. The analysis below suggests
.4 is likely to be a significant underestimate of the true
elasticity. 2ptions include David Levhari and Eytan
Sheshinski, and Robert Hall. Levhari and Sheshinski's
analysis is confined to a partial equilibrium framework.
Hall's study parallels this one in many respects but
reaches radically different conclusions about the welfare
consequences of capital taxes. Using a life cycle model
without retirement, he does conclude that aggregate
savings are likely to be quite interest elastic on grounds
quite similar to those considered here.
3The two-period consumption savings decision is ex-
tensively discussed in Martin Feldstein and S. C. Tsiang.
implies a negative savings response. In thc
knife-edge Cobb-Douglas case where thi
elasticity of substitution is one, savingt
are independent of the interest rate. Sinct
the last case seems reasonable, and theor)
does not offer an unambiguous verdict or
the sign of the interest effect, it is frequenti)
held that savings are likely to be interest
insensitive. This notion is supported by verba
reference to conflicting substitution and in
come effects. Martin Feldstein (1978) ha
shown that in a two-period setting, savingt
may be usefully viewed as expenditure or
future consumption. The case where saving
are insensitive to the interest rate occurt
when the price elasticity of demand for fu
ture consumption is one.
The usual two-period formulation of thi
savings decision obscures two importani
aspects of reality. In all modem theories,
saving is carried on to provide for futur
consumption. All savings are eventually dis
saved. Net positive savings arise only be
cause the young who save are more afflueni
and numerous than retired dissavers. In ordei
to realistically model the determination o
net savings, it is necessary to take account ol
the dissaving of older generations. This is not
usually done in two-period formulations ol
the problem which treat the savings decisior
as equivalent to the choice of C,.
The second difficulty with the usual two
period formulation is that it obscures thi
role of future labor income. In a multiperioc
setting, the endowment W, in equation (l
represents the present value of future laboi
income. When the interest rate rises, thi
endowment declines as future income is mort
heavily discounted. Even in the Cobb-
Douglas case where the consumption pro
pensity out of wealth is independent of tht
interest rate, consumption will fall as tht
interest rate rises through what might bc
called a human wealth effect.4 With income
constant, an increase in savings is implied
Since savings represent only a small fractior
4lhis terminology may be somewhat misleading. In
creases in the interest rate to reduce the value of con
sumers' endowment measured in terms of first-perio
consumption. However, in general, they broaden the se
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where y is the elasticity of the marginal
utility function. The expression l/(l —y)
corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity Of
substitution in consumption. Solving the in-
dividual maximization problem (3) yields the
conditions:
(4a) C1= Coel(r_S)/(I ))1
—14(f:!. ) —r] =
(er_a)/_)_1.)T_ l)(g—r)
It is clear from (4) that the slope of the
age-consumption profile rises with the inter-
est rate, with the sensitivity depending on y.
In order to find aggregate consumption, it is
necessary to aggregate over the consumption
of all persons alive at a point in time. Using
equations (4) the consumption of persons of
each age can be calculated as a function of
their initial wage. The relative number of
persons of each age depends on the popula-
tion growth rate n. The larger is n, the greater
the fraction of the population which is young.
By adding up consumption at each age,
weighted by relative population size, and ini-
tial wage W0, total consumption of the popu-
lation may be calculated.
From aggregate consumption, it is possible
to calculate the savings rate out of labor
income using the steady-state assumption.
Steady-state growth implies that
(5)(n+g)KwL+rK—c=s
where n is the rate of population growth.
problem becomes
(3)JTC7 _8tth_A[fTC,etdt
of income, even a small effect on consump-
tion can translate into a large effect on sav-
ings.
In order to realistically take account of
human wealth and the difficulties of aggrega-
tion, it is necessary to formulate a model in
which many generations coexist at any in-
stant. This is most easily done in continuous
time. Models of.the type outlined below have
been used by James Tobin, Hall, M. J. Far-
rell and Laurence Kotlikoff to explore van-
ous aspects of life cycle savings. Let us first
consider individual and then aggregate sav-
ings.
Individuals choose a consumption plan to
maximize an intertemporal utility function,




whereT represents the certain date of death,5
T' the age of retirement, 8 is a discount
factor, and W represents labor income. In
order to render the problem tractable, I adopt
a constant elasticity utility function,6 and
assume that at any instant all workers receive
the same wage which rises exponentially at
rate g.7 With these assumptions the La-
grangian for the individual maximization
51n this paper, perfect certainty is assumed
throughout. Robert Merton has demonstrated in a con-
tinuous-time framework that allowing for uncertainty
does not alter the character of the optimal intertemporal
consumption plan. However, it might importantly affect
the analysis of tax changes, which alters both the return
and risk from savings.
6The constant elasticity utility function with a con-
stant discount rate is capable of generating smooth
consumption paths with any slope. It is not clear that
the additional range of behavior admitted by more
general utility functions is very plausible. In any event a
"smooth" consumption stream is a central assumption
of all life cycle theories of savings.
'It would be desirable to explicitly incorporate an
instantaneous age earnings profile. However, Alan
Blinder argues that because the profile rises and then
declines after about age 50, the approximation adopted
here is not likely to be too inaccurate.
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Solving equation (5) it is apparent that
IC
'6'"/ WL r—n—g








It is noteworthy that (7) shows that the life
cycle hypothesis gives rise to a steady-state
aggregate savings function which may be
represented by a variable propensity to save
out of labor income, and a zero-savings pro-
pensity out of capital income. The life cycle
hypothesis thus gives rise to a savings func-
tion which is quite different than that usually
assumed in growth models which allow dif-
ferent savings propensities out of different
types of income.
It is clear from (7) that the relationship
between savings and the interest rate is com-
plex and depends on all of the other parame-
ters in the model. In Table 1 the savings rate,
defined as S/ WL,andinterest elasticity of
aggregate savings 17r' evaluated at various
values of the interest rate, are reported for
plausible parameter values. It is assumed that
population grows at a 1.5 percent per an-
num, productivity increases by 2 percent per
annum, and that individuals live fifty-year
economic lives with retirement at age 40.
Somewhat arbitrarily, a 3 percent utility dis-
count factor was chosen.














si., 3.36 1.89 1.87
S/WL .068 .142 .210
7=—.5
s, 3.09 1.71 1.54
S/WL .049 .096 .135
y=—I, 2.87 1.59 1.37
S/WL .038 .073 .099
= —2
s, 2.38 1.45 .122
S/ WL .028 .048 .063
7= —5
I, .741 1.09 1.18
S/WL .014 .019 .025
Note: The calculation assumes n =.015,g.02,T' =50,
T=40, and 8=03. The savings rate is measured as a
fraction of labor income.
The results universally support a high in-
terest elasticity. In the plausible logarithmic
utility case, the interest elasticity of the sav-
ings rate varies from 3.36 at 4 percent to 1.87
at 8 percent. This case also generates the
most reasonable values for the aggregate sav-
ings rate. The table demonstrates the un-
importance of the elasticity of substitution
between present and future consumption. For
example, at an interest rate of .06, the elastic-
ity of saving varies only from 2.26 when
y= 1/2 to 1.09 when y= —5. The insensitiv-
ity of the elasticity to the level of y reflects
the fact that the "reduction in human wealth"
effect is much more important that the sub-
stitution effect of interest changes. The basic
conclusion, a significant long-run interest
elasticity of aggregate savings, is quite robust
to changes in all of the parameter values.
While very low values of y could generate
low or even negative savings elasticities, they
would also give rise to unrealistic savings
propensities, unless the other parameter val-
ues are set to implausible levels. Almost any
plausible life cycle formulation is likely to
imply a high long-run elasticity of savingsVOL. 71 NO.4 SUMMERS: CAPITAL TAXATIONANDACCUMUL4TJON 537
with respect to the interest rate. It seems fair
to conclude that two-period analyses of the
effects of capital taxes are likely to be quite
misleading. Efforts to use empirical savings
elasticities to estimate elasticities of substitu-
tion between present and future consump-
tion are very misguided, unless the "human
wealth effect" is explicitly considered.
So far it has been assumed that saving is
motivated only by the desire to provide for
retirement consumption. This assumption has
been challenged by Kotlikoff and myself
(1979). We suggested that the life cycle hy-
pothesis could account for only a relatively
small fraction of total savings. Our results
indicate that a significant fraction of capital
formation is motivated by a desire to leave
bequests. Assuming that consumers bequeath
a constant proportion of lifetime income
would not have any important impact on the
results. Robert Barro has shown that if be-
quests arise from maximization of a utility
function in which the utility of future gener-
ations appears as an argument, the intertem-
poral decision problem is radically altered.
Essentially, this case is equivalent to treating
each consumer as if he had an infinite hori-
zon, since he internalizes the welfare of fu-
ture generations. Miguel Sidrauski has shown
that, in this case, the long-run savings rate is
infinitely interest elastic as the capital stock
is always driven to a "modified Golden Rule"
level. Thus allowing for such bequests would
strengthen the conclusions reached here.
Interest elasticities of savings as high as
those reported in Table 1 appear at first
blush to be flatly contradicted by the avail-
able empirical studies which have found only
small interest rate effects. Beyond the stan-
dard problems of errors in variables,8 an
"Typically, studies have used the nominal interest
rate as a measure of the return on savings. Only Boskin
has used the more appropriate real after-tax rate. Even
this series is flawed because the long-term interest rate
accurately reflects the return on only a small part of
savings. Satisfactory measures of the expected return on
equity, homes, and durable goods are nonexistent. Since
the interest rate has been fairly highly correlated with
income and wealth over the past forty years, even small
errors in interest rate measures could cause very signifi-
cant underestimation of interest rate effects.
specification error,9 there is an important
reason to expect interest rate effects in usual
empirical specifications to differ from those
calculated here. At issue here is the change in
the savings rate out of income when the
interest rate changes. Usually, in empirical
work, wealth is held constant. Since interest
rate changes exert their effect in part through
changes in wealth, this procedure is likely to
obscure the impact of interest rates. The
importance of this question is apparent in
Boskin's careful study of the interest elastic-
ity of savings. Its results imply a direct sav-
ings elasticity of about .4, with respect to
interest rate changes, and about 2.8 with
respect to changes in wealth. Thus, if the
interest elasticity of wealth is .5,the"full
effect" interest elasticity of savings is 1.9,
which is within the range suggested here.
The discussion in this section establishes a
prima facie theoretical case for a high inter-
est elasticity of savings. This conclusion ap-
pears to follow almost ineluctably from a
realistic life cycle ' This implies
that the frequent assumption of a constant
savings rate in analyses of economic growth
may be quite inaccurate. It also indicates
that the case w'here savings depend nega-
tively on the interest rate, which yields path-
ological results in many models, can legiti-
mately be ruled out. A high interest elasticity
of savings has important implications for
almost all questions bearing on capital accu-
9Life cycle theories imply that the age structure of
the population, the rate of growth of output, life ex-
pectancy, and expected retirement age all affect the
savings rate. None of these variables has been included
in time-series savings equations.
'°If all wealth were held in the form of consols, the
elasticity would be one; if it were all held in short assets,
it would be zero. Common stock fluctuations which
account for most of the variation in wealth are known to
be caused by interest rate changes. The simplest valua-
tion model in which the P-Eratiois set equal to the
interest rate would imply an elasticity of one. Of course,
with changes in taxes, and pretax profitability the actual
situation is much more complex. The assumption of a .5
elasticity seems conservative.
"A fuller effort to reconcile the theoretical calcula-
tions with the empirical evidence may be found in my
earlier paper which treats issues surrounding the short-
run response of savings to both transitory and perma-
nent changes in the interest rate.531 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER1981
mulation. Its impact on estimates of the inci-
dence and welfare consequences of capital
taxation are examined in some detail in suc-
ceeding sections of this paper.
IL Mtematlves to Capital Taxation
It is widely believed that taxation of labor
income is equivalent to consumption taxa-
tion as long as there are no bequests. This
section demonstrates the extremely restricted
sense in which this proposition is correct,
and shows that wage and consumption taxa-
tion in a general equilibrium setting have
different effects in both the short and long
run.'2 It follows that even if consumption
taxation is optimal, replacing capital taxes
with taxes on labor income may not be de-
sirable.
The sense in which consumption and labor
income taxation are equivalent is easily dem-
onstrated by specifying the individual's
budget constraint in each case. With wage
taxation the budget constraint is
(8) fTC_rid frw(lt)_rtdto
The budget constraint with consumption
taxation takes the form
(9)frce_rtdrfTwe_rtdt=0 0 0
where t is the ad valorem tax rate on con-
sumption. It is apparent that if t =1L'the
two tax regimes offer consumers equivalent
choice sets, and, in a present value sense,
raise equal revenues. Since consumers have
the same opportunity set, they will choose
the same optimal consumption path under
each regime. It is in this restricted sense that
wage and consumption taxes may be said to
be equivalent.
In a life cycle setting, savings arise because
the desired consumption stream does not
'2FeIein (l9lSb) has examined the transition away
from capital taxation. His analysis underscores the im-
portance of compensating the older generation in shift-
ing to consumption taxation, but does not emphasize the
different effects of consumption and wage taxation in
the long run.
match the path of income. Since the timing
of tax collection is very different under wage
and consumption taxes, they have very dif-
ferent effects on savings. Savings at an in-
stant t are the difference between income
and consumption. Hence with consumption
taxation savings may be written as
(10) -- S,=W+rA1—
while under wage taxation savings are
(11)S=(1—tL)+rA,—C,
Quite clearly there is no reason why these
expressions need be equal period by period.
Consumption taxation extracts revenue later
in the individual's lifetime than does wage
taxation and so causes more savings in the
younger years. The difference in the aggre-
gate savings rate between the two types of
taxes depends on the age structure of the
population. But it is clear from (10) and (11)
that there is no a priori reason to expect
equal savings rates.
Equations (9) and (10) illustrate an im-
portant property of consumption taxation. It
is completely neutral with respect to the sav-
ings rate. It is clear from (9) that for any
homothetic utility function along the optimal
path Ce/I —twill be the same for any value
of t. This implies, using (10), that savings at
all ages and hence aggregate savings are also
unaffected by the tax rate. Equation (11)
shows that this property does not hold for
taxes on wage income, since the time path of
savings is altered. In fact, as the results in the
next section demonstrate, wage taxation sig-
nificantly reduces capital intensity relative to
consumption taxation.
A second important difference between
wage and consumption taxation lies in the
government budget constraint. The usual
argument demonstrating the equivalence of
wage and consumption taxation assumes that
the government raises the same present value
of re ienue from each individual under both
regimes. A somewhat plausible requirement
is that in each period the government raisesVOL. 71 NO.4 SUMMERS:CAPITAL TAXA TIONAND ACCUMULATION 539
the same amount of revenue from the total
population under each tax.'3 If G is the gov-
ernment's revenue requirement, the budget
constraint under wage taxation is
(12)fT_nsw(1)dsG
while under consumption taxation the con-
strarnt is
fCj-ds=G
Theseequations do not imply that tr=
Thereason for this is straightforward. The
individual is discounting at rate r in calculat-
ing the present value of taxes paid at differ-
ent ages. On the other hand, the government
in steady states implicitly discounts at n, the
rate of population growth. As long as r>n,
the government can meet its budget con-
straint, and reduce the present value of the
taxes each individual must pay by postpon-
ing the extraction of taxes. As noted above,
consumption taxes postpone tax payments
relative to wage taxes. Hence, with consump-
tion taxation it is possible to reduce the
steady-state present value of taxes paid by
the representative individual.
Feldstein (1978b) has observed that wage
and consumption taxes involve quite differ-
ent transition paths. To see this, consider the
sudden imposition of a consumption tax.
Consumers of all ages are equally affected.
On the other hand, imposition of a wage tax
has no effect on the retired segment of the
population. Loosely speaking, the consump-
tion tax is less burdensome on workers in the
steady state, because it taxes more heavily
those who are alive at the moment when it is
imposed.
The analysis in this section indicates that
it is inappropriate in either the short or long
'3DavidBradford emphasizes the importance of this
"balanced budget" requirement He argues that without
such a requirement the government by running sur-
plusesordeficits can control the level of the capital
stock given any tax structure. The "real world"feasibil-
ityof this sort of policy seems unclear.
run to regard consumption and labor income
taxation as equivalent even in the absence of
bequests. Since they give rise to different
age-savings patterns, they do not have the
same effect on steady-state capital intensity,
Of equal importance, the rates which are
necessary to meet a constant government
budget constraint will differ between the two
taxes. In the next section, both wage and
consumption taxes are considered as alterna-
tives to capital income taxation,
Ill. Steady-State Comparisons
of Tax Alternatives
In this section, the effect of replacing
capital income taxes with wage and con-
sumption taxes is examined by comparing
steady states. In order to make a general
equilibrium comparison of tax alternatives, it
is necessary to join a production side to the
life cycle savings model examined in the first
section. James Tobin and Robert Hall have
shown this can be done diagramatically.
Above, it was shown that life cycle savings
gives rise to a savings-labor income ratio
which is a function of the interest rate. Un-
der the steady-state assumption, this can be
readily converted into a capital-labor income
ratio by dividing by the growth rate. This is
represented by the SS curve in Figure 1. The
production function also implies a relation-
ship between the capital-labor income ratio
and the interest rate. This is plotted as PP in
Figure 1. (In the Cobb-Douglas case it is a
rectangular hyperbola.) In the no-capital tax
case, equilibrium occurs where the curves
cross. Now consider the effect of imposing a
tax on capital income. This drives a wedge
between the gross interest rate determined by
the production function and the net rate
received by savers. The new equilibrium oc-
curs where the difference between the inter-
est rate along the PP and SS curves is equal
to the tax. It is clear from the figure that as
long as savings respond positively to the
interest rate, imposition of a capital tax raises
the gross return and reduces the net return
on capital. Hence capital taxes will be par-
tially but not completely shifted,
The characteristics of a steady state can be
calculated numerically by finding the value540 THEAMEPJCANECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 19
of K for which
14)S(FL(1—tL),FK(1—tK))—K
n+g—
whereS(•) represents the aggregate savings
function provided in (7). Once the steady-
state value of K is found, the levels of output
and consumption as well as factor prices can
be found from the steady-state condition (5)
and the production function.
In calculating the effects of tax changes, it
is necessary to make assumptions about
parameter values. The parameters of the sav-
ings function are the same as those assumed
above. In the results reported below, loga-
rithmic utility (y=0) is assumed. As will be
shown, the main conclusions are not sensi-
tive to this assumption. Tax changes are
analyzed with elasticities of substitution in
production of 1 and 1/2.14 In each case,
parameters of the production function were
chosen so that the capital share was .25. The
appropriate value of the tax rates is not easy
to determine. The capital tax is presumed to
represent the combined effect of corporate
taxes, individual income taxes on dividends
and interest income, and property taxes. Re-
'4These numbers represent bounds on the true elas-
ticity. Cross-section estimates typically imply that a is
close to 1, while time-series estimates suggest an elastic-
ity close to 1/2. Robert Lucas, after contrasting these
approaches, concludes that the time-series estimates are
to be preferred.
cent evidence (see the 1980 paper by Fek
stein and myself) suggests that inflation ha
substantially raised the effective rate of a
these taxes. A value of .5 for the capita
income tax rate seems conservative on th
basis of these considerations)5 A tax rate c
.2 on labor income is also assumed. Thes
assumptions imply that government revenue
equal 27.5 percent of GNP, which is withii
the empirically reasonable range.
The model was solved for the steady stat
under this tax regime. The steady state wa
PP then recalculated with the capital tax re
placed by a wage tax with exactly equa —*rrevenue yield and with both the interest am
labor income taxes replaced by a consump
tion tax. Thus, all the analysis here is carrim
out within a differential incidence frame
work, in which alternative sources of tht
same amount of government revenue art
contrasted. Representative results are pre
sented in Table 2.
It is interesting to note that the base calcu
lation shown in column I corresponds quiu
accurately to the actual American economy
The gross of tax return on capital in botI
cases mirrors the average return on capital ol
11 percent estimated by Feldstein and mysell
(1977). The savings rate of about 8.5 percenl
is close to the historical rate.
The shift away from capital taxation has
very substantial effects. In the Cobb-Douglas
case, steady-state income rises by about 14
percent if wage taxation is used and 18 per.
cent with consumption taxation. The in-
crease in income occurs because the high
interest elasticity of savings leads to a large
increase in capital intensity. Indeed the
capital-output ratio rises by almost 75 per-
cent in the consumption tax solution. This
increase drives down the gross return on
capital from 10.5 to 6.1 percent. Conse-
quently the owners of capital do not benefit
greatly from the removal of the capital tax.
On the other hand, the increase in capital
intensity raises the gross wage. The increase
'51t is the effective marginal rate which is at issue
here. This will depend critically on the method of fi-
nancing of marginal investment. Joseph Stigjitz has
argued that complete debt financing at the margin would
imply a zero effective rate. This view has been chal-
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RG 0.105 0.112 0.069 0.066 0.061 0.056 —42.4 —51.9—53.7 —66.3
RN 0.053 0.056 0.069 0.066 0.061 0.056 26.1 16.2 14.3 0.4
i3'6 1.000 2.018 1.155 2.420 1.202 2.526 14.4 18.1 18.3 22.4
WN 0.800 1.614 0.788 1.604 1.202 2.526 —1.6 —0.6 40.0 44.0
Y/L1.334 2.84! 1.541 3.111 1.604 2.179 14.4 9.1 18.3 11.2
C/L0.856 1.769 0.977 1.928 1.004 1.955 13.1 8.6 15.9 10.0
K/Y2.373 2.589 3.652 3.375 4.117 3.653 42.4 26.4 53.7 34.1
S/Y0.083 0.091 0.128 0.118 0.144 0.128 42.4 26.4 53.7 34.1
Note: These calculations assume n0.015, g=0.02, 7=0.001, and that rw 0.2 and r,0.5 in the current system.
is large enough to almost completely offset
higher taxes on labor income. The net wage
falls by less than 1 percent when capital
taxes are replaced by the payroll tax.
Since the gross rate of return in the equi-
libnum with capital taxes is well above the
Golden Rule level, steady-state consumption
is increased as capital intensity rises. When
capital taxes are replaced by wage taxes,
consumption rises by 14.2 percent, while it
rises by 17.1 percent with consumption taxes.
Of course these gains cannot be interpreted
as a measure of the steady-state welfare in-
crement from eliminating capital taxes. The
appropriate criterion is the utility of thtrep-
resentative individual.
The steady-state change in the welfare of
the representative individual can be ex-
pressed as a fraction of lifetime income as
follows. In a steady state, individual welfare
V is given by
V=JTCTe_atdt
Substituting using equation (4) yields an
expression for lifetime utility as a function of





where TN = r( I —1K)the net interest rate, and
human wealth H is given by
W( l1L )(e_rN)T—1) (17) H=
(g— TN)
Welfare V can be compared across alterna-
tive steady-state paths. However, in order to
yield a meaningful result, it is necessary to
express the welfare difference in operational
units. This may be done most easily by
calculating the percentage change in lifetime
earnings in the base steady state which would
be necessary to yield the welfare level
reached in the altered steady state. To do
this, it is necessary to solve the equation:
(18) v(HI(l+L),Tfl=v(H2,T)
for L, which is a measure of the welfare
difference between the two steady states. Un-
like most welfare loss calculations this ap-
proach does not rely on differential ap-
proximations. It is accurate for changes of
any
Table 3 presents the steady-state welfare
gains from the tax changes, outlined above
for alternative utility and production func-
tions. The results indicate the potential for
large gains from eliminating capital taxes. In
the intermediate case, where y=O, instituting
a payroll tax would raise welfare by the
'6Cien and Shesbinaki have demonstrated the danger
of extrapolating differential approximation to tax effects
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T.ai 3—TuE STEADY-STATE WELFARS COST OF CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION
y0.5 y=0.001 ,=—I




Consumption Taxation 14.0 15.9
(0=)
17.4
Payroll Taxation 6.1 8.6 12.9
Consumption Taxation 6.5 10.0
Welfare Gain (expressed as a percentage of lifetime income)
(o=l)
17.2




Payroll 3.8 3.5 1.1
Consumption 6.2 9.4 16.2
Note: Calculated assuming that n0.015, g0.02, and that t,=0.2 and 4=0.5 in the current system.
equivalent of almost 5 percent of lifetime
income, while consumption taxes would raise
welfare by about 12 percent, or almost five
years' earnings. Applying these figures to
American aggregates yields huge annual
flows, about $80 billion in the former case
and approximately $200 billion in the latter.
These large gains are smaller than the gains
in steady-state consumption shown in the
top half of the table. This is because the
increase in the net interest rate leads individ-
uals to consume later in their lifetimes, re-
ducing the increases in welfare. There are
two reasons why the welfare gain tends to be
smaller for lower values of y. First, a lower
value of y implies a lower savings elasticity,
and hence less gain from approaching the
Golden Rule. Second, a small 1' implies only
a small distortion of the shape of the con-
sumption path.
A very surprising feature of the results is
the large difference in steady state welfare
between consumption and wage taxes. For
example, in the Cobb-Douglas y 0 case, the
steady-state gain in welfare arising from
shifting from labor to consumption taxation
approaches $100 biffion a year. The greater
welfare under consumption taxes occurs for
two reasons. As noted in the previous sec-
tion, capital intensity is higher with con-
sumption taxes, which raises welfare by mak-
ing possible a higher level of steady-state
consumption. The second reason is probably
more important. Consumption taxation re-
duces the present value of the taxes eac]
individual pays during his lifetime. This (X
curs because the tax burden is increased 01
those alive during the transition to consumç
tion taxation. Hence the steady-state cots
parison may be a poor indicator of the ci
ficiency advantages of consumption taxation
The calculations presented here indicat
that partial equilibrium calculations of th4
welfare consequences of capital taxes an
likely to be very misleading. Such calcula
tions focus on the welfare loss which take
place because the taxation of interest distort
the shape of the consumption profile. Th
results here indicate this effect is of oni'
minimal importance. Since in a realistic lifi
cycle model, savings are very interest elastic
changes in capital taxes have only a smal
effect on the net interest rate. Thus partial
equilibrium analysis by assuming a constan
grossinterestrate greatly overstates the im
portance of intertemporal substitution ef
fects.
The important effect of removing capita
taxes on welfare is not captured in partial
equilibrium analyses. The large increase is
capital which results raises real wages anc
leads to a larger level of sustainable con
sumption. It is the interaction of increasec
capital intensity with the preexisting distor
tion of a significant divergence from th
Golden Rule, which causes the removal ol
capital taxes to lead to such large gains is
these calculations.VOL. 71 NO.4 SUMMERS: CAPITAL TAXATION AND ACCUMUL4 TION 543
There are two potentially important diffi-
culties with the analysis. First, no allowance
is made for variable labor supply. The distor-
tion of the labor-leisure choice is not consid-
ered in evaluating the welfare consequences
of wage taxation. It seems unlikely that re-
laxing the assumption of inelastic labor
supply would alter the results in an im-
portant way. The general equilibrium effects
described above imply that shifting to wage
taxation changes real wages only slightly.
Hence, labor supply is likely to be little
affected. Allowing for intertemporal varia-
tion in labor supply might actually increase
the estimated gain from reducing capital
taxes. Similar conclusions apply to consump-
tion taxation.
Second, the analysis here is confined to
steady-state comparisons. Higher steady-state
consumption is achieved only at the expense
of consumption during the transition to the
new steady state. Hence, the costs of transi-
tion must be weighed against the long-term
gain. This issue is considered in my 1979
paper where the transition path following the
elimination of capital income taxation is
simulated numerically. It is shown there that
convergence to a new steady state is quite
rapid, and that at plausible discount rates,
the gain far exceeds the transition cost. It is
also demonstrated that it is possible to re-
form taxes in a Pareto-superior way; that is,
so that all those alive on or after the day of
the changeover are made better off.
IV.Conclusions
The results in this paper suggest that the
welfare cost of capital income taxation may
have been seriously underestimated. For rea-
sonable parameter values, the annual welfare
gain from a shift to consumption taxation is
conservatively estimated at 10 percent of
GNP. This surprising conclusion emerges
from an examination of tax effects in the
context of a realistic life cycle growth model.
The large estimates reported here differ from
previous estimates for two main reasons.
First, the multipenod model used here sug-
gests that a very high interest elasticity of
savings is likely to obtain for almost any
reasonable parameter values. Second, the
estimates in this paper incorporate the gen-
eral equilibrium effects of tax changes. The
most important of these is the increase in
gross wages which results from the increased
capital intensity arising from eliminating
capital taxation.
The model used in this study, while more
realistic than the conventional two-period
formulation, could usefully be extended in
several directions. The discussion in this
paper ignores the financing of investment. In
effect it assumes that all investment is equity
financed at the margin. Recently Joseph
Stiglitz has suggested that the corporate tax
may in reality be a lump sum tax, as corpo-
rate investment is completely debt financed
at the margin. If this controversial conclu-
sion is correct, it is clear that the analysis
here greatly overestimates the welfare cost of
capital taxes. The results in this paper under-
score the importance of empirical and theo-
retical research bearing on the effective
marginal tax rate on capital income.
This analysis has not considered differen-
tial taxation of different types of capital.
Alan Auerbach has shown that optimality
does not dictate uniform tax rates if overall
capital intensity is not at the Golden Rule
level. It would be useful to extend the cur-
rent analysis by examining a corporate tax
which falls on only some of the capital used
in production.
While these extensions would be valuable,
it is unlikely that the basic conclusion of this
analysis would be altered. Capital income
taxes are likely to appear very undesirable in
any sort of realistic life cycle formulation. A
question of central importance is the realism
of the life cycle hypothesis. While its implica-
tion of a high interest elasticity of savings
may seem implausible, it is the only frame-
work currently available for evaluating com-
peting tax policies. Examining its realism
and/or devising an alternative to it seems a
necessary prerequisite to a fuller understand-
ing of the effects of capital taxation.
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